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Abstract 
Since the fall of the Franco’s regime in Spain, the Spanish governments have been dealing with the 
low-intensity conflict in their country, namely the Euskadi Ta Askatusuna (ETA) attacks. This 
article analyzes the Basque conflict within the framework of the conflict analysis and resolution 
perspective. First, it highlights the conflict issues among the Basque conflict parties. Second, it 
clarifies the conflict issues by focusing on kidnapping and assassination done by the ETA during 
1990s. The special case of Miguel Angel Blanco who was a local Basque councilman is a case 
study. In order to shed light on the Blanco case, it is necessary to focus the conflict resolution 
dynamics of the Basque conflict. Third, the paper aims to examine the Blanco case in terms of 
conflict issue identification, conflict issue clarification, and conflict cultural analysis perspectives. 
The issue identification perspective focuses on identity, face, and instrumental issues of the Basque 
conflict. The issue clarification perspective concentrates on two conflicting parties’ perceptions 
and positions in the conflict. The cultural analysis perspective mainly attempts to analyze the cross-
cultural differences between ETA and the Spanish government. Based on the analysis of Miguel 
Angel Blanco, this study concludes that it is necessary to reframe, re-identify and re-clarify the 
Basque conflict within the framework of conflict and peace studies.  
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1. Introduction 
The Spanish government has been involved in an “ethnic” conflict over territory in the 
Northern Spain known as the Basque Country. It is known as the Spain – ETA conflict or the 
Basque conflict. Although it has been a part of the Spanish territory since the Medieval Times, the 
Basque people who mostly live in Spain consider themselves having the oldest culture and language 
in all of Europe. In the mid-1930’s, the Franco’s Fascist regime has been able to control all over 
Spain after the Spanish Civil War. Franco also claimed that the “long struggle between centralism 
and regionalism in the country” was ended (Clark, 1980a, p.80). He launched a series of anti-
regionalist policies in the Basque provinces, including hampering food distribution, disposition of 
the regional government, and outlawing use of the native Basque tongue, the Euskera. Furthermore, 
the policy allowed the police to make mass arrests for the use of the Euskera even though the 
Euskera was used by ordinary people for their normal daily conversations just on the street. 
        In a reaction to the growing repression of the oppressive Franco regime against the Basque 
people, a regionalist and anti-fascist movement known as ETA (“Euskadi Ta Askatasuna” or “the 
Basque Country and Freedom”) has been formed from previously less organized student protest 
and union groups. The ETA members banded all together with the singular goals of the Basque 
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unity and separatism from Franco – controlled Spain. Beginning on July 31, 1959, ETA would have 
gained “a major impact on Basque and Spanish politics.” (Rinehart, 2013, p. 53-75; Clark, 1984, 
p.27)  
        During its first decade of existence, ETA was organized around three distinct ideological 
principles. The first was being an old nationalist theme of emphasis on cultural and linguistic 
freedom for Basques. Proponents argued that “language was the principle or even the soul of a 
valid definition for a nation.” (Clark, 1984, p.33) These advocates believed that the only way to 
preserve the Euskadi culture was to establish a separate Basque state. The ETA’s second major 
ideological principle consisted of a series of Marxist-held beliefs. Marxist ETA members stressed 
the importance of the liberation of the Basque working class and those of all Spanish workers from 
the industrial oligarchies of Spain, Great Britain, and the United States. In contrast to the strong 
separatist ETA membership, proponents of Marxism did not necessarily want independence but 
preferred opposition to the Fascist government, believing that true freedom can only come about 
with an alliance with the Spanish working class (Ciment and Hill, 1999, p. 1190). The third major 
ideological theme was influenced by events in the Third World in the 1960s, based on a reaction to 
the Western European and American colonialism, forging ties with various the Third World 
Groups such as the Algerians and the Vietnamese (Sullivan, 2015, p. 41). Followers of this ETA 
ideology were devoted to the ideas laid by the Latin American revolutionary, Che Guevara. This 
philosophy stated that “if the objective conditions for revolution were not correct, then the 
revolutionary elite had the obligation to go on the offensive and begin the struggle in order to bring 
those objective conditions into being” (Clark, 1984, p.32-34). 
        ETA’s first violent direct actions against the government began on July 18 1961, when they 
attempted to derail a series of trains carrying Franco supporters to San Sebastian to celebrate the 
25th anniversary of Franco’s victory in the Spanish Civil War (Gomez, 2017, p. 105). Their 
attempted derail, though unsuccessful, was met with the harsh and swift reaction by Spanish 
authorities They arrested and tortured more than 100 ETA members, with some members 
receiving jail sentences of 15 to 20 years (Clark, 1984, p.35). The ETA was included on terrorist lists 
by the European Union (EU) and the United States. It was a violent secessionist organization. 
        ETA has taken a part of the Basque nationalist and political movements. The Spanish 
government has labeled ETA’s activities as political violence and terrorism. In the Basque politics, 
ETA’s surrogate political party, Herri Batasuna, has become another main political actor during the 
post-World War II era.  The tactics employed by ETA included bank robberies, exaction of a 
“revolutionary tax” from targeted Basque businesses, intimidation, sloganeering, public graffiti, 
kidnapping, assassinations and bombings (Douglass and Zulaika, 1990, p. 238). Up until the end of 
1997 when Miguel Angel Blanco was kidnapped and assassinated, ETA had been killed 
approximately more than 800 people over the forty-year period, and approximately one third of the 
victims have been civilians (Law, 2009).  
         In addition, there have been anti-democratic attitudes and behaviors such as police actions in 
the Basque region against the ETA members. Under principles of the rule of law and democratic 
state, it is unacceptable to use torture against the detained members of ETA. The Basque National 
Liberation Movement has thought police actions in 2005 as violence, torture, and state terrorism. 
ETA members have claimed that they were routinely tortured by the security forces and 
paramilitary patriotic group during the period of the mid-1980s of “the dirty war” (La guerra sucia). 
This study aims to shed light on the Basque conflict and the ETA within the framework of 
kidnapping and assassination during the period of 1990s. It specifically focuses on the ETA’s 
kidnapping and the assassination of Miguel Angel Blanco who was a local Basque councilman. The 
Blanco case is the turning point in public opinion for the Basque conflict. It has sent a wave of 
dislike through Spain. At least six million Spanish people have demonstrated on the streets to 
protest against the ETA’s bloody violence for four days. As a result, some of ETA own members 
have publicly condemned the killing of Blanco. From that point, ETA no longer believed that it can 
achieve its goals through violent means. The turning point for the Basque conflict came when the 
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ETA have lost its public support in 1997 when there has been massive public demonstrations and 
street protests after the death of Miguel Angel Blanco. The growing public dislike against ETA 
violence has reached its climax because the kidnappings and assassinations have not produced 
desired effects that forced the Spanish government negotiations. The efficiency of ETA violence 
has increasingly become in question. Before the Blanco incident, the Basque parties have signed the 
Pact of Ajurea-Enea in which the main Basque institutions declared their oppositions of ETA using 
violent tactics on 12 January 1988. It opened the road of the marginalization and isolation of ETA. 
Also, the close cooperation between Spanish and French security forces resulted in the capture and 
imprisonment of ETA members in France (Gibbons, 1999, p.24). 
After the Miguel Angel Blanco incident, the conflict has reached “the mutually-hurting 
stalemate” (Zartman and Touval, 1996) for the conflicting parties. First, the research explains 
negotiation and conflict resolution dynamics in the Basque conflict. Next, this article analyzes how 
this incident could be a tool for the resolution of conflict by focusing on the conflict issue 
identification, conflict issue clarification, and conflict cultural analysis. In the third section, the 
conflict identification examines the Spanish government and ETA instrumental issues as well as 
face and identity issues. With a holistic approach, this study claims that the Basque conflict should 
address all three issues: instrumental, face and identity issues. Fourth, the issue clarification 
perspective concentrates on two conflicting parties’ perceptions and positions in the conflict. In the 
fifth part, the cultural analysis perspective, mainly attempts to analyze the cross-cultural differences 
between ETA and the Spanish government. The study clarifies three issues by explaining the 
positions and interests as well as underlying needs. Based on the analysis of Miguel Angel Blanco, it 
is concluded that it is necessary to reframe, re-identify and re-clarify the Basque conflict within the 
framework of conflict and peace studies. Last, it suggests some conflict resolution steps not only 
manages but also transforms the ETA conflict.  
 
2. Issue Identification  
The issues involved in the Spain – ETA conflict have manifested themselves in 1997 in the 
kidnapping and assassination of Miguel Angel Blanco, a local Basque country councilman from 
Ermua. The conflict exists between not two equal parties, but rather between a Western and 
industrialized European power and a marginalized, ethnic minority and paramilitary group. For this 
reason, issues have not been negotiated on an even playing field. 
The instrumental issues in the 1990s involved in the conflict from the ETA standpoint 
were: (1) transfer of ETA members and other Basque nationalists, currently being detained in 
Spanish prisons, into prisons in Pais Vasco (the Basque country); (2) fair and just electoral 
processes in Pais Vasco; and (3) and the eventual secession of Pais Vasco from Spain. The Spanish 
government’s instrumental interests were the release of all hostages currently being held by ETA 
and the end of ETA-sponsored violence throughout Spain. 
The major characteristics of the relationship between the Spanish government and ETA 
were paranoia and distrust. Even with Herri Batasuna’s significant drop in the polls in Basque 
elections during the 1990s, ETA claimed that the Spanish government “fixes” the elections in favor 
of the more moderate PNV (Partido Nacinalista Vasco or Basque Nationalist Party) and the heavily 
Spanish controlled PP (Partido Popular or Popular Party) (Burns, 1997). In a sign of Spanish distrust 
and paranoia, the government refused to initiate peace talks or discuss settlement with ETA until 
ETA declares a full and open cease-fire that is “unilateral, permanent and verifiable by the 
international community” as well as surrenders all arms. 
The two central issues in this conflict were the issue of face and the issue of identity. 
Specifically, this is an issue of perception of the identity of both self and other (Öğretir and Özçelik, 
2008).  ETA’s self-perception was that they are a nation representing Basque people, language, and 
culture. ETA perceived the Spanish government as an unacceptable and illegitimate colonial power. 
The Spanish government considered itself a legitimate nation-state with governmental authority 
over all provinces of Spain, including Pais Vasco. It perceived ETA as simply a criminal terrorist 
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organization, with no support and no legitimacy. Spain feared a loss of face both domestically and 
internationally if it overtly negotiated and made concessions to a terrorist group dismissing their 
support in Pais Vasco. Spanish face was attacked because of ETA kidnapping and executions of 
public officials as well as propagandizing against the Spanish state. The face issue between the 
Government of Spain and ETA wrecked during the capture and execution of Miguel Angel Blanco.  
Miguel Angel Blanco, 29, was a Basque town councilor and low-ranking member of Jose 
Maria Aznar’s ruling the Popular Party (PP) at that time. Blanco was kidnapped by ETA on July 11, 
1997 after leaving his home in Ermua. ETA threatened to execute Blanco unless the government 
met its demand: the government must have transferred 500 ETA inmates to the Basque country 
prisons by 4 p.m. on July 13, 1997. The government was given a time limit of 48 hours to respond. 
However, government officials dismissed ETA’s demand, saying it would not succumb to 
blackmail and change policy in the face of a threat (Black, 2010, p. 157). Many Basque nationalist 
leaders, even those who oppose ETA activities, have also pressed for the transfer of prisoners. This 
came after numerous outcries that prisoners were mistreated, and in fact tortured in Spanish jails 
(TAT Report, 1993).  
Identity and face issues were salient in this incident. They denoted an individual’s concern 
for the others’ and self’s presentations, reputation and face. In Blanco’s kidnapping, both personal 
and social identity issues were important. In respect to personal identity, when ETA demanded the 
government the transfer of 500 jailed rebels to prisons in the Northern Basque region, the 
government refused to give into what it termed “blackmail.” (Murua, 2017).  
The social identity issues were more important because of culture and past history (Öğretir, 
2017a, 2017b). First, ETA has kidnapped 77 people during its existence. However, it has only set 
deadlines to execute hostages twice before (Washington Post, 1997, p.A16). In both cases, the 
threats were carried out. Therefore, ETA had only one choice to save and maintain their image – to 
kill Blanco. Second, Blanco was abducted because the government had succeeded in freeing Jose 
Lara, a prison officer who ETA held captive for nearly 18 months (Martínez, Uria, and Arrospide, 
2016). ETA had made the same demand for the release of Jose Lara. The government refused the 
ultimatum because they felt that a concentration of ETA prisoners would pose a threat to security. 
More importantly, the government refused to succumb to the demands of terrorist groups. In the 
Lara situation, ETA lost face because government officials freed him before ETA was able to take 
further action. As a consequence, ETA set a 48-hour deadline for the Blanco kidnapping (Reiss, 
2010)  
ETA’s kidnapping of a Sigma factory manager in Basque country, Berezadi, presented some 
similarities with the Blanco incident. In the Berezadi kidnapping, Spanish Interior Minister Fraga 
Iribane took a hard line position – no negotiation with terrorists. The environment surrounding 
Berazadi appeared to be non-hostile and comfortable until his whereabouts were discovered by the 
landlady. At this point, ETA quickly convened six members of its ruling committee to decide 
whether or not to kill Berezadi. At first, the voting was deadlocked between moderates and hard-
liners. On the third ballot, one of the moderates abstained and the order went out to kill the 
hostage because failure to do so would have damaged ETA’s credibility (Douglas and Zulaka, 
1990). Paralleling the Blanco case, two points can be made: (1) ETA followed through on threats of 
execution when such threats were made, and (2) assassinations could have been random, 
indiscriminate, and unpredictable. 
Collective emotions ran high and created an exceptionally intense reaction to the abduction 
and the subsequent death of Miguel Angel Blanco. In his hometown, Ermua, 14,000 citizens 
gathered in memory of Miguel Blanco and in protest of his death. It was a turning point for the 
Basque conflict. Reactions were intense across Spain, with demonstrations taking place in city and 
town centers surpassing even those which followed the failed 1981 coup  d’état. Police estimated the 
crowds in Madrid at nearly one million and in Barcelona at 900,000. Tens of thousands more 
packed at streets in nearly every major Spanish city. In Bilbao alone, 100,000 people were on the 
streets to cry against ETA violence (Managanas, 2016). It is estimated that six million people may 
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have taken part in the demonstrations across Spain calling for Blanco’s immediate release 
(Whitfield, 2014, p. 83). Messages of condolence were sent from all over the world, including the 
Vatican and the French government. The leaders of all the political parties in the Basque regional 
parliament, excluding Herri Batasuna, held an emergency meeting and released a statement saying, 
“ETA is weaker and more alone today than yesterday, but the society is more United than ever.” 
(New York Times, 1997, p.13) 
The emotional issues of this conflict have gone well beyond ETA and the Spanish 
government. The citizens of Spain; Basque or otherwise, carried and expressed the intense 
emotional burden over both Miguel Blanco and the conflict in general. While the Spanish 
government and ETA continued not to engage one another in productive dialogue, the people of 
Spain were unifying under the banner of “ETA, Basta Ya.” That loosely translated from Spanish 
means “ETA, it is enough. Stop It Already.” A slogan was quickly being adopted by several people 
peace initiatives in Pais Vasco (Magone, 2004, p. 22).  
 
3. Issue Clarification  
ETA’s intentions have not changed for a long time. First, ETA has insisted that Euskera 
and Euskadi culture should be the dominant in the Basque region. Moreover, the Basque language 
and culture should have been used in the educational and religious institutions. Second, ETA has 
intended to free the Basque region from Spanish economic control. Pais Vasco is rich in 
manufacturing, fishing, and has excellent soil deposits for commercial agriculture. It constitutes a 
large percentage of Spain’s financial base in heavy industrial manufacturing. ETA wants Pais Vasco 
to take full control over Basque economy from Spain. As a result, these intentions have culminated 
into ETA’s ultimate goal of complete Basque separation from Spain. 
ETA’s perception of the issues surrounding this conflict is based on their interpretation of 
what is and is not Basque language, culture, and history. ETA believes that Euskera is the official, 
national language of Pais Vasco. Using history to justify their logic, ETA affirms Euskera’s 
legitimacy, because its use predates all other European languages. ETA dislikes Spanish control 
over Basque region what they consider to be a birthright. This perception is an outward expression 
of the group’s anti-colonial ideology (Clark, 1984, p.64-65). ETA has projected the whole of its 
culture strictly based on the use of its language. The issue of culture and language will be discussed 
in greater depth below. 
ETA’s perception of an independent Basque economy follows the same logic as does its 
argument for language and culture. ETA believes that control of the Basque economy is the right 
of the Basque people. Although Pais Vasco prospers, economically; ETA believes that it is not the 
duty of the Basque people to accept and follow Spanish economic policy. 
With growing interdependence between Basque and Spanish peoples socially and 
economically, ETA fears to the total annihilation of the Basque identity through assimilation. This 
fear is compounded by a growing sense among ETA that the organization is dwindling and could 
soon cease to exist. ETA’s insistence on direct confrontation with the Spanish government, in the 
pursuit of secession, has caused internal rifts in the organization and subsequent departure of 
members (Zirakzadeh, 1977, p.171). 
On the other side of the conflict lies the Spanish government whose intentions, perceptions 
and fears have also fallen along the lines of instrumentality, identity and face. Spain’s approach to 
this conflict was not one of facing an adversary, but instead dealing with a criminal. The Spanish 
Ministry of the Interior issued, in four different languages, including English, a 22-minute counter-
propaganda VHS tape titled “The Face of ETA.” ETA rebels were labeled as a “gang of terrorist 
thugs,” (Face of ETA, 1997; Pluchinksy, 2015, p. 51-52). Spain has attempted to influence the 
world’s perception of ETA. Spain has adopted a popular, Western government approach to dealing 
with what they term to be a terrorist activity. A “no negotiating with terrorist” stance has been the 
predominant philosophy employed by Spain in dealing with ETA (Aviles, 2006, p. 45). The 
government’s intentions were to deal with issues concerning the Basque people, once ETA puts 
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down their arms.  Before the Spanish government has engaged in talks, significant concessions 
must have first been made by ETA, specifically surrendering all arms. 
In the 1990s, the Spanish government has felt that it has granted extremely liberal 
concessions to the Basque region, more so then any other Spanish provinces. In 1978, the Spanish 
government ratified a new constitution making all regional languages co-official with Spanish in 
each language’s respectful region. The Spanish Ministry of Education has since supported Basque 
language schools financially and has established obligatory Euskera instruction in the Basque 
provinces of Vizcaya and Guipdzcoa (Clark, 1980a, p.82). In 1980, the Autonomy Statute was 
enacted, establishing regional government control over schools, language, health care, industry, and 
police. The Basque region as well as Catalonia are the only two provinces that do not pay a national 
tax to Madrid. Spain considers their issues with ETA as moot. They have normalized relations with 
the Basque region and do not consider themselves in conflict with Pais Vasco. 
With every “terrorist” attack and violent outburst, Spain feared its citizenry losses personal 
safety and trust in their government. The rationale for adopting a “zero tolerance” stance against 
negotiating with terrorists was an underlying fear that engaging in talks would grant ETA 
legitimacy. Such talk may also have encouraged more acts of violence from ETA or other groups 
who perceive the government as weak and willing to bow to demands. 
In the 1990s, optimism was at an all-time low for the two parties engaged in this conflict. 
ETA’s dwindling membership, lack of funds, and decreasing support in the Basque region has 
made the organization all the more desperate. ETA’s demand for independence was supported by 
less than 20 % of Basque people and Herri Batasuna has seen its support decline to about 10 % at 
the polls (New York Times, 1997). The government has remained entrenched in its policy towards 
ETA and shown no sign of hopeful resolution. 
Even though there has been no obvious end in sight for this conflict during the Blanco 
kidnapping, motivations for both parties have existed for peaceful resolution. If ETA has 
continued on its path of decreasing membership and loss of support after the Blanco killing, then 
the organization has been all but gone in a matter of time. During the last decade, ETA has been 
fighting more for its own survival than the pursuit of its original goals. As long as solutions could 
have been presented allowing ETA to bow out gracefully while preserving their face and integrity, 
there should have then existed a motivation for ending the violence. With constant citizen outcry 
over ending the violence, the government should have had strong motivation in being the anti-
terrorist movements that have begun advocacy for the reinstatement of the death penalty. 
 
4. Cultural Analysis  
The conflict between ETA and the Spanish government is not a typical case of cross-
cultural difference as much as it is one of the different perceptions of the same dominant culture in 
Spain. The conflict exists among people who share a high – context Mediterranean, Roman 
Catholic culture. However, the conflicting parties do not share the perception that they are of the 
same cultural identity. Identity is the fundamental cultural value that creates difference amongst the 
Spanish government and ETA in the Basque provinces. History plays an important role in the 
shaping of Mediterranean cultures and is a major factor in the relationship between ETA and the 
government (Öğretir, 2008). The perception and interpretation of history are important in 
exploring a cultural analysis of the conflict between ETA and the Spanish government. 
The perception of identity and a strong sensitivity to history are the key variables in 
understanding cultural differences between ETA and the government. Although ETA is citizens of 
Spain, they do not consider themselves Spanish – they are Basque. Once again Hall offers insight 
into the nation within the state. 
“The paradoxical part of the identification syndrome is that until has been resolved there 
can be no friendship and no love – only hate. Until we can allow others to be themselves 
and ourselves to be free, it is impossible to truly love another human being; neurotic and 
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dependent love is perhaps possible, but not genuine love, which can be generated only in 
the self” (Hall, 1981, p. 237 – 238).  
What constitutes the differences between who identifies with a Basque identity and the 
dominant Spanish? Two variables provide the best answer for criteria—language and birthplace. A 
survey conducted in the 1970’s by Spanish sociologist, Salustiano del Campo, concluded that forty 
percent of the population surveyed in the Basque provinces, Viczaya, Guipúzcoa and Álava, 
believed that the Basque region was the most important focal point of their self-identification. 
However, thirty-one percent of the population surveyed claimed that being from Spain was the 
focus of their identity. There was some difference between native born Basque peoples who 
believed that speaking the Basque language—Euskera, is the only true determinant of who is 
Basque and who is not, while others believed that one must be a native-born Basque as well as a 
Euskera speaker (Clark, 1980b, p. 78). Almost half of the survey respondents of del Compo study 
revealed that they used Euskera at home and family. 66.9 percent indicated that “all people who 
lived in the Basque region should learn to speak Euskera.” (Clark, 1979, p. 145).  
       Another important discovery from del Campo’s survey pointed to the important role of the 
perception of history in the ETA – Spanish conflict. Over fifty-three percent of the native born 
Basque believed that their region was and is persecuted and punished by the Spanish government. 
This feeling of persecution is one that Basque has encountered since the tenth century. The region 
has been politically and economically dominated by outside civilizations, after its period as a 
mountainous tribal region that fiercely resisted encroachers such as the Celts, Romans, Visigoths, 
Franks and Muslims. The area was widely thought of as uninviting to conquest because of its 
terrain. As the Kingdom of Navarra gained economic might in the tenth century, political 
coherence amongst the region was established. But as the Navarrese kingdom slipped into decline, 
the emerging power on the Iberian peninsula—the Kingdom of Castilla took control of the Basque 
lands. Throughout the next millennium, a push and pull relationship developed between the Basque 
and the Castellan, then Spanish governments. Traditionally, the individual provinces of the 
kingdom enjoyed self-governance within their provincial boundaries. (Clark, 1980a, pp.79-80). 
The freedoms given the province declined greatly after the sixteenth century. The need for 
the Spanish to fully exploit the Basque coastline during its exploration and conquest of the 
Americas has increased Spanish migration to the region. Also, a new socio-economic class was 
established, the bourgeoisie, called as juantxos. The juantxos were closely tied to the Spanish vis-a-
vis commerce. This class was highly influenced by the French revolution and enlightenment. The 
beginnings of class schism developed in the region at this time, pitting agrarian and independent 
Basque versus urban and Spanish linked merchants and professionals (Taylor, 2002, p. 30). During 
this time a conflict between regionalism and centralism broke out throughout Spain. The region 
developed an industrial base and became very important to Spain that was in the midst of losing its 
empire. The Spanish government deemed it necessary to reverse the regional laws and incorporate 
the Basque region into its economy. The Basque historical culture of resistance took shape once 
again. The first Basque nationalist movement began in the 1890’s. The movement was heavily 
populated with people who did not have strong economic ties to the Spanish (Clark, 1980b, p.80) 
The Spanish Civil War created a temporary regional autonomy in the country. The Spanish people 
had experienced full of violent conflict through years of dictatorship, class anarchy and revolution 
Many participants of the meeting of the San Sebastián Pact were later imprisoned as Francisco 
Franco’s Second Spanish Republic reared toward itself dictatorial way. The Basque region lost all of 
its political autonomy (Beevor, 1982, p.24-26; Casanova, 2010, p.43). 
The Basque people have reacted to the new situation at that time by increasing their 
nationalist spirit. Economic and military defiance to Franco was represented by the creation of the 
independent Republic of Euzkadi; the significance of history to the culture was not lost on the new 
republic as oaths were sworn at the aforementioned oak tree in Guarnica (Minahan, 2002, p. 286). 
The republic was conservative in its politics and excluded participation by any non-Basque. The 
Basque were labeled as communists by Franco while he appealed to Spain’s unifying cultural 
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heritage – the Catholic Church. Spanish archbishops accused Basque priests of carrying out acts of 
war and being the messengers of communism, not God (Beevor, 1982, p.161-162). These were 
serious accusations in a country that identifies greatly with its Roman Catholic tradition that is the 
cornerstone of the Mediterranean culture. Years after the Basque forces surrendered to the Franco 
government, ETA considered Euzkadi to continue to be at war with Franco because they believed 
that Franco dishonored the agreement (Beevor, 1982, p.170). Franco ordered summary executions 
of Basque militia. ETA mistrusted the government and deemed it illegitimate. An important reason 
for the perceived illegitimacy was Franco’s forced suppression of Euskera in the region. The 
language was impermissible in all parts of public life; similarly, traditional Basque names were 
changed to Spanish ones. This policy continued into the 1950’s. 
The Roman Catholic Church in Spain together with Vatican permitted Basque vernacular 
during the Catholic mass in the early 1950’s. After 1968, the teaching of the language was permitted 
in special language schools—Ikastolas. The Spanish government did not encourage the schools, but 
attendance was high among Basque youths (McNair, 1984, p. 162). Another change was the 
publication of cultural writing in Euskera, while political works in Euskera continued to be banned. 
Despite the legal implications of a return to Euskera use in the region after the 1978 
constitutional reinstatement, usage continues to decline. Economic modernization and migration of 
Spanish peoples to the region were the principal reasons for Euskera’s erosion. The region 
developed industrially and has become an economic dynamo in Spain (Clark, 1980b, p.82). 
Prosperity brings migration to the region. As a result, more Spanish live in Pais Vasco than ever 
before. Cultural interactions and transactions with the Spanish population have transformed the 
region.  
Class differences that have been created since the economic boom reflected those of the 
mercantile age of exploration. ETA’s membership and their supporters in the region are typically 
not from the socio-economically upper classes of Basque society. Scholar, Robert P. Clark, who has 
studied the Basque extensively, believes that the Basque nationalists have won more than most 
nationalist movements, e.g. regional autonomy and control of language (Clark, 1980b, p.92). 
However, it may boil down to the cultural definitions of liberation and victory. Both the Spanish 
and Basque are proud high-context cultures which have a long-term conception of time.  
 
5. Conclusion: Conflict Resolution Concerns 
        In order to be able to make headway towards resolution of this conflict, it is necessary to 
reframe the issues from what they appear to be to a new perception focusing on the transformation 
of this conflict. As mentioned previously, the instrumental issues that ETA claims are central to this 
conflict have generally been addressed and resolved by the Spanish government. It is more 
important to focus on why ETA feels compelled to continue armed insurrection. Some of the 
reasons why ETA has continued in its struggle at that time were as follows: (1) There is a strong 
sense of distrust with the government, regardless of changes in policy. (2) ETA continues to claim 
that Spain violates the human rights of incarcerated ETA members. (3) ETA considers themselves 
the sole defender of Basque culture. (4) There have been no options presented to them to de-
escalate the conflict and reenter society. 
It has been made clear that in order for this conflict to end, talks must be engaged between 
the conflicting parties. This has not, and it is predicted that happened in an overt matter. The 
opportunity for open communication has existed for numerous years within the Spanish and 
regional Pais Vasco parliaments. Herri Batasuna, moderate Basque nationalist parties, and Partido 
Popular’s representatives in Parliament. All parties in the conflict have ignored opportunities for 
open engagement because of their intractable and deep-rooted positions. 
Regardless of the positions assumed by both the Spanish government and ETA, there has 
been an overt call for peace by a nationwide, popular movement. People throughout Spain, and 
especially in Pais Vasco, have demonstrated to meet their basic human needs, namely security and 
identity to stop the violence. Both the government and ETA recognize the existence and potential 
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of such a popular movement. However, both groups were misguided in their interpretation of 
popular sentiment. The Spanish government has chosen to attempt to garner support by vilifying 
ETA and justifying government policy with regards to ETA (Face of ETA, 1993). Conversely, 
ETA believed that the outpour of public sentiment was, in fact, a show of support for the 
separatist’s movement. In protest of the conviction of Herri Batasuna’s 23 member directorate, the 
separatists through the party, were calling a general strike on December 15, 1997 in Pais Vasco 
(Reuters, 1997). 
While each side recognized the potential in the popular movement, they have chosen to 
attempt to manipulate it rather than tap into its true agenda, namely ending the violence. This 
movement can be the catalyst towards a resolution of peace. Throughout history, social movements 
such as the Anti-Vietnam War Movement in the United States, the Pro-Democracy Student 
Movement in China, and the Democratic Movement in the Philippines have provided the needed 
political motivation towards the settlement of the conflict. 
In order to transformation for this conflict to occur, both parties must realize that they are 
in the position what Zartman has terms a “mutually-hurting stalemate.”  This occurs “when one 
side realizes that it is unable to achieve its aims, resolve the problem, or win the conflict by itself; it 
is completed when the other side reaches a similar conclusion.” (Zartman and Touval, 1996, p.450-
451; Ozcelik, 2013). ETA was faced with the distinct possibility of being wiped out without ever 
achieving its goal of secession. Similarly, the Spanish government faced increased possibility of 
more violence and hostage-taking and a dissatisfied voting public. If action was not taken, the 
conflict might have escalated and more lives might have been lost. 
            Negotiations have begun between the government and ETA, but not initially over 
instrumental issues. Instead, early talks should have focused on building a foundation for the 
restoration of the mutual face as well as a transformation from distrust into trust. In order to 
accomplish this goal, a third party is necessary as a go-between and to enhance trust-building. In the 
past, the Vatican and the Roman Catholic Church have been viable third parties in the Basque-
Spanish conflict. The Church can act as a unifying agent between the two parties, building on their 
existing religious ties. Before the assassination of M. Angel Blanco, ETA and the Spanish 
government had held peace talks twice. First, the Socialist government of Felipe Gonzalez had 
talked with the ETA representatives in Algeria in 1989. Second, the Conservative government of 
Jose Maria Aznar had met with the ETA members in Switzerland in 1998. Both of these talks had 
been held in secret and had been unsuccessful. The assassination of M. Angel Blanco has mobilized 
more than six million people not only all over Spain but also in the Basque regions. The crowd has 
chanted “Vascos Si, ETA No” (“Basque Yes, ETA No.”) (Randle, 2003, p. 165). This is known as 
“The Spirit of Ermua.” (Beck, p. 217).  
          The negotiation between the ETA and the Spanish government has had some difficulties 
during the 1990s. Both conflicting parties have had deep distrust against each other. They also 
perceived the conflict from different perceptions. ETA and Batasuna have seen conflict from 
political-military perspective and insisted on structured negotiations and political agreement. The 
Spanish governments have perceived ETA as the terrorist organization and any peace process may 
be seen as ‘surrender’. The ceasefires have perceived as “face-saving exit” strategy for ETA. But for 
the government, they would like to erase ETA from the Spanish political scene (Whitfield, 2014, p. 
160).  
           In the 1990s and the 2000s, some trust-building initiatives have been mutually engaged fact-
finding missions with a nonpartisan, third-party expert to observe both elections and prison 
conditions. These initiatives could have gone a long way towards building a level of security and 
cooperation between the two parties. It was hoped that through this process, the issue of secession 
became completely moot to both parties. On top of these concerns, there must have been 
constructive talks concerning the potential re-entry of ETA members into civil society. These were 
several potential issues that could have been addressed without ever discussing the need for 
secession while still working towards resolution of the conflict. 
 
Özçelik, S. (2017). The analysis of Basque conflict and ETA in the 1990s: The kidnapping of Miguel Angel Blanco, 
Journal of Human Sciences, 14(2), 1058-1069. doi:10.14687/jhs.v14i2.4429 
 
 
1067 
          In order for talks to be successful and these potential initiatives to come to being, a proper 
environment must have first been established. The environment must have been conducive to 
trust-building and cooperation. It was felt that the only way to achieve peace and negotiation 
atmosphere was: (1) ETA’s guarantee to halting any further acts of violence and aggression, (2) 
Suspension of government policy of “non-negotiation” with terrorists, and (3) negotiations must be 
held in a closed setting (without media or public interference).  
           In studies of negotiation and conflict resolution, much attention is mostly paid to the role of 
government actors, political party leaders, and sometimes international mediators. There have been 
other organizations which may have had the influence on the Basque peace processes. The Basque 
Labour Union (LAB) and the pacifist organization, Elkarri/Lokarri, have also been a significant 
contributor to the Basque conflict resolution dynamics. It has five guiding principles: “non-violence 
and human rights, dialogue and agreement, democratic rules and the consultation of society, respect 
for the plurality and diversity of public opinion, and support for constructive contributions” 
(Elkarri, 2012).  
All conflicting parties and actors have come together in different times and places to 
negotiate and mediate the final peace agreement. After each attempt to reach a negotiated solution 
to the Basque conflict has failed, there has been an escalation of violence, especially kidnapping and 
assassinations. In escalation and de-escalation cycle of conflict, when conflicting parties has 
intensified violence with bombings and assassinations, public opinion has initiated campaigns, 
demonstrations, and street marches to support a negotiated peace settlement between the Spanish 
Government and ETA. In addition, violent conflicts in other parts of the world have been resolved 
through dialogue and negotiation that may positively affect the Basque peace process since lessons 
have been learned from them. The problem of separatist political violence cannot be found a 
solution based solely on the force by using the police and security forces. The solution to the 
Basque conflict could be only based on justice and peace with dialogue and negotiation. The most 
important step between the conflicting parties is to take the Basque conflict from violence cycle of 
the streets to the table of political negotiations. Peaceful and democratic solution to the conflict 
must include the accommodation of the rights of all those involved. For ETA, face-saving issues 
have been important because it should not have lost its legitimacy among its own sympathizers.  
This conflict has had the potentials for resolution. Fortunately, the potential for a never-
ending and mutually destructive struggle has decreased in the last ten years. Acknowledgment of 
any past wrongs and harm done by both sides has been an essential step in the transformation of 
this conflict as well as the desire to move forward together for peaceful future. The objective of 
resolution was to validate all conflicting issues for each party and to create a new relationship based 
on trust and the ability to deal with differences peacefully. The prolonged negotiations have moved 
ETA to accept “the definite end of its armed activity” in 2011. However, the positive peace 
requires the absence of structural and cultural violence that can be only achieved by post-conflict 
and post-accord peace building and conflict transformation. It is still early to declare that the 
Basque conflict is ended.    
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